|Benefit-Cost Summary Statistics Per Participant|
|Taxpayers||$60,725||Benefits minus costs||$374,201|
|Participants||$0||Benefit to cost ratio||$4.86|
|Others||$428,523||Chance the program will produce|
|Indirect||($18,107)||benefits greater than the costs||100%|
|Net program cost||($96,939)|
|Benefits minus cost||$374,201|
|Meta-Analysis of Program Effects|
|Outcomes measured||Treatment age||No. of effect sizes||Treatment N||Adjusted effect sizes(ES) and standard errors(SE) used in the benefit - cost analysis||Unadjusted effect size (random effects model)|
|First time ES is estimated||Second time ES is estimated|
Crime elasticity: property
Change in property crime rates in response to a particular policy change.
|Detailed Monetary Benefit Estimates Per Participant|
|Affected outcome:||Resulting benefits:1||Benefits accrue to:|
|Crime elasticity: property||Crime||$60,725||$0||$428,523||$30,363||$519,611|
|Program cost||Adjustment for deadweight cost of program||$0||$0||$0||($48,470)||($48,470)|
|Detailed Annual Cost Estimates Per Participant|
|Annual cost||Year dollars||Summary|
|Program costs||$86,597||2011||Present value of net program costs (in 2018 dollars)||($96,939)|
|Comparison costs||$0||2011||Cost range (+ or -)||20%|
Benefits Minus Costs
Benefits by Perspective
Taxpayer Benefits by Source of Value
|Benefits Minus Costs Over Time (Cumulative Discounted Dollars)|
|The graph above illustrates the estimated cumulative net benefits per-participant for the first fifty years beyond the initial investment in the program. We present these cash flows in discounted dollars. If the dollars are negative (bars below $0 line), the cumulative benefits do not outweigh the cost of the program up to that point in time. The program breaks even when the dollars reach $0. At this point, the total benefits to participants, taxpayers, and others, are equal to the cost of the program. If the dollars are above $0, the benefits of the program exceed the initial investment.|
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