ALL |
META-ANALYSIS |
CITATIONS |
|
Benefit-Cost Summary Statistics Per Participant | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Benefits to: | ||||||
Taxpayers | $78,568 | Benefits minus costs | $491,232 | |||
Participants | $0 | Benefit to cost ratio | $5.32 | |||
Others | $544,074 | Chance the program will produce | ||||
Indirect | ($17,614) | benefits greater than the costs | 100% | |||
Total benefits | $605,028 | |||||
Net program cost | ($113,796) | |||||
Benefits minus cost | $491,232 | |||||
Meta-Analysis of Program Effects | ||||||||||||
Outcomes measured | Treatment age | No. of effect sizes | Treatment N | Adjusted effect sizes(ES) and standard errors(SE) used in the benefit - cost analysis | Unadjusted effect size (random effects model) | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
First time ES is estimated | Second time ES is estimated | |||||||||||
ES | SE | Age | ES | SE | Age | ES | p-value | |||||
Crime elasticity: property Change in property crime rates in response to a particular policy change. |
28 | n/a | 0 | -0.763 | 0.116 | 28 | -0.351 | 0.123 | 28 | 0.000 | 0.001 |
Detailed Monetary Benefit Estimates Per Participant | ||||||
Affected outcome: | Resulting benefits:1 | Benefits accrue to: | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Taxpayers | Participants | Others2 | Indirect3 | Total |
||
Crime elasticity: property | Crime | $78,568 | $0 | $544,074 | $39,284 | $661,926 |
Program cost | Adjustment for deadweight cost of program | $0 | $0 | $0 | ($56,898) | ($56,898) |
Totals | $78,568 | $0 | $544,074 | ($17,614) | $605,028 | |
Detailed Annual Cost Estimates Per Participant | ||||
Annual cost | Year dollars | Summary | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
Program costs | $90,927 | 2011 | Present value of net program costs (in 2022 dollars) | ($113,796) |
Comparison costs | $0 | 2011 | Cost range (+ or -) | 20% |
Benefits Minus Costs |
Benefits by Perspective |
Taxpayer Benefits by Source of Value |
Benefits Minus Costs Over Time (Cumulative Discounted Dollars) |
The graph above illustrates the estimated cumulative net benefits per-participant for the first fifty years beyond the initial investment in the program. We present these cash flows in discounted dollars. If the dollars are negative (bars below $0 line), the cumulative benefits do not outweigh the cost of the program up to that point in time. The program breaks even when the dollars reach $0. At this point, the total benefits to participants, taxpayers, and others, are equal to the cost of the program. If the dollars are above $0, the benefits of the program exceed the initial investment. |
Evans, W.N., & Owens, E.G. (2007). COPS and crime. Journal of Public Economics, 91(1-2), 181.
Levitt, S.D. (2002). Using electoral cycles in police hiring to estimate the effects of police on crime: Reply. The American Economic Review, 92(4), 1244-1250.
Lin, M. (2009). More police, less crime: Evidence from US state data. International Review of Law and Economics, 29(2), 73-80.
McCrary, J. (2002). Using electoral cycles in police hiring to estimate the effect of police on crime: Comment. The American Economic Review, 92(4), 1236-1243.
Shi, L. (2009). The limit of oversight in policing: Evidence from the 2001 Cincinnati riot. Journal of Public Economics, 93(1), 99-113.
Worrall, J.L., & Kovandzic, T.V. (2010). Police levels and crime rates: An instrumental variables approach. Social Science Research, 39(3), 506-516.