ALL |
META-ANALYSIS |
CITATIONS |
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Benefit-Cost Summary Statistics Per Participant | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Benefits to: | ||||||
Taxpayers | ($2,864) | Benefits minus costs | ($10,968) | |||
Participants | $0 | Benefit to cost ratio | n/a | |||
Others | ($17,065) | Chance the program will produce | ||||
Indirect | $2,032 | benefits greater than the costs | 9% | |||
Total benefits | ($17,898) | |||||
Net program cost | $6,929 | |||||
Benefits minus cost | ($10,968) | |||||
Meta-Analysis of Program Effects | ||||||||||||
Outcomes measured | Treatment age | No. of effect sizes | Treatment N | Adjusted effect sizes(ES) and standard errors(SE) used in the benefit - cost analysis | Unadjusted effect size (random effects model) | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
First time ES is estimated | Second time ES is estimated | |||||||||||
ES | SE | Age | ES | SE | Age | ES | p-value | |||||
Crime Any criminal conviction according to court records, sometimes measured through charges, arrests, incarceration, or self-report. |
28 | n/a | 0 | 0.018 | 0.021 | 30 | 0.018 | 0.021 | 40 | 0.000 | 0.001 | |
Crime elasticity: property Change in property crime rates in response to a particular policy change. |
28 | n/a | 0 | -0.351 | 0.095 | 30 | -0.246 | 0.029 | 30 | 0.000 | 0.001 |
Detailed Monetary Benefit Estimates Per Participant | ||||||
Affected outcome: | Resulting benefits:1 | Benefits accrue to: | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Taxpayers | Participants | Others2 | Indirect3 | Total |
||
Crime | Criminal justice system | ($481) | $0 | ($1,059) | ($240) | ($1,780) |
Crime elasticity: property | Crime | ($2,384) | $0 | ($16,006) | ($1,192) | ($19,582) |
Program cost | Adjustment for deadweight cost of program | $0 | $0 | $0 | $3,465 | $3,465 |
Totals | ($2,864) | $0 | ($17,065) | $2,032 | ($17,898) | |
Detailed Annual Cost Estimates Per Participant | ||||
Annual cost | Year dollars | Summary | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
Program costs | ($5,640) | 2012 | Present value of net program costs (in 2022 dollars) | $6,929 |
Comparison costs | $0 | 2012 | Cost range (+ or -) | 10% |
Benefits Minus Costs |
Benefits by Perspective |
Taxpayer Benefits by Source of Value |
Benefits Minus Costs Over Time (Cumulative Discounted Dollars) |
The graph above illustrates the estimated cumulative net benefits per-participant for the first fifty years beyond the initial investment in the program. We present these cash flows in discounted dollars. If the dollars are negative (bars below $0 line), the cumulative benefits do not outweigh the cost of the program up to that point in time. The program breaks even when the dollars reach $0. At this point, the total benefits to participants, taxpayers, and others, are equal to the cost of the program. If the dollars are above $0, the benefits of the program exceed the initial investment. |
Blumstein, A., & Wallman, J. (2006). The crime drop in America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bushway, S.D., & Owens, E.G. (2013). Framing punishment: Incarceration, recommended sentences, and recidivism. Journal of Law and Economics, 56(2), 301-331.
Drago, F., Galbiati, R., & Vertova, P. (2009). The deterrent effects of prison: Evidence from a natural experiment. The Journal of Political Economy, 117(2), 257-280.
Gottfredson, D.M., & National Institute of Justice (U.S.). (1999). Effects of judges' sentencing decisions on criminal careers. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice.
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Levitt, S.D. (1996). The effect of prison population size on crime rates: Evidence from prison overcrowding litigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(2), 319-351.
Meade, B., Steiner, B., Makarios, M., & Travis, L. (2012). Estimating a dose-response relationship between time served in prison and recidivism. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, DOI: 10.1177/0022427812458928.
Oliver, B.E. (2011). Recidivism: A multi-level explanation. St. Louis, Mo: University of Missouri, St. Louis.
Snodgrass, G.M., Blokland, A.A.J., Haviland, A., Nieuwbeerta, P., & Nagin, D.S. (2011). Does the time cause the crime? An examination of the relationship between time served and reoffending in the Netherlands. Criminology, 49(4), 1149-1194.
Spelman, W. (2005). Jobs or jails? The crime drop in Texas. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 24(1), 133-165.
Spelman, W. (2013). Prisons and crime, backwards in high heels. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, DOI: 10.1007/s10940-013-9193-2.