|Benefit-Cost Summary Statistics Per Participant|
|Taxpayers||$142||Benefits minus costs||$325|
|Participants||$0||Benefit to cost ratio||$3.88|
|Others||$282||Chance the program will produce|
|Indirect||$14||benefits greater than the costs||53 %|
|Net program cost||($113)|
|Benefits minus cost||$325|
|Meta-Analysis of Program Effects|
|Outcomes measured||Treatment age||No. of effect sizes||Treatment N||Adjusted effect sizes(ES) and standard errors(SE) used in the benefit - cost analysis||Unadjusted effect size (random effects model)|
|First time ES is estimated||Second time ES is estimated|
Any criminal conviction according to court records, sometimes measured through charges, arrests, incarceration, or self-report.
Violations of the conditions of an individual’s terms of probation, parole, or supervision.
|Detailed Monetary Benefit Estimates Per Participant|
|Affected outcome:||Resulting benefits:1||Benefits accrue to:|
|Crime||Criminal justice system||$142||$0||$282||$71||$494|
|Program cost||Adjustment for deadweight cost of program||$0||$0||$0||($56)||($56)|
|Detailed Annual Cost Estimates Per Participant|
|Annual cost||Year dollars||Summary|
|Program costs||$4,459||2015||Present value of net program costs (in 2018 dollars)||($113)|
|Comparison costs||$4,353||2015||Cost range (+ or -)||10 %|
Benefits Minus Costs
Benefits by Perspective
Taxpayer Benefits by Source of Value
|Benefits Minus Costs Over Time (Cumulative Discounted Dollars)|
|The graph above illustrates the estimated cumulative net benefits per-participant for the first fifty years beyond the initial investment in the program. We present these cash flows in discounted dollars. If the dollars are negative (bars below $0 line), the cumulative benefits do not outweigh the cost of the program up to that point in time. The program breaks even when the dollars reach $0. At this point, the total benefits to participants, taxpayers, and others, are equal to the cost of the program. If the dollars are above $0, the benefits of the program exceed the initial investment.|
Bagdon, W. & Ryan, J.E. (1993). Intensive supervision of offenders on prerelease furlough: An evaluation of the Vermont experience. FORUM on Corrections Research, 5(2). Retrieved June 23, 2011 from http://www.csc- scc.gc.ca/text/pblct/forum/e052/052j_e.pdf
Brown, K.L. (2007). Effects of supervision philosophy on intensive probationers. Justice Policy Journal, 4(1). Retrieved June 23, 2011 from http://www.cjcj.org/files/effects_of_0.pdf
Byrne, J.M., & Kelly, L.M. (1989). Restructuring probation as an intermediate sanction: An evaluation of the implementation and impact of the Massachusetts Intensive Probation Supervision Program (Executive Summary). Final report to the National Institute of Justice, Research Program on the Punishment and Control of Offenders.
Hyatt, J.M., & Barnes, G.C. (2014). An Experimental Evaluation of the Impact of Intensive Supervision on the Recidivism of High-Risk Probationers. Crime & Delinquency, early edition online.
Petersilia, J., & Turner, S. (1990). Intensive supervision for high-risk probationers: Findings from three California experiments. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
Petersilia, J., Turner, S., & Deschenes, E. P. (1992). Intensive supervision programs for drug offenders. In J. M. Byrne, A. J. Lurigio, & J. Petersilia (Eds.), Smart sentencing: The emergence of intermediate sanctions (pp. 18-37). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Smith, L.G., & Akers, R.L. (1993). A comparison of recidivism of Florida's community control and prison: A five-year survival analysis. Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency, 30(3), 267-292.
Turner, S., & Petersilia, J. (1992). Focusing on high-risk parolees: An experiment to reduce commitments to the Texas Department of Corrections. Journal of Research on Crime & Delinquency, 29(1), 34-61.